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I. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ' 
An appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 3. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Did the trial court err in failing to set aside the default judgment against 
Defendant/Appellant Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(4), due to the judgment being void for want of personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant/Appellant? 
Standard of Review: De novo. Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., 1991 UT App LEXIS 
102,1[3, 815 P.2d 245. Franklin Covev Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110,1[8, 2 
P.3d451. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See pp. 30-33 of the record. 
Issue #2: Did the trial court err in failing to set aside the default judgment against 
Defendant/Appellant Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(1), due to the judgment being obtained through mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, and/or excusable neglect? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Neilson Land 
& Water Co.. 1913 Utah LEXIS 80,^6,134 P. 911. 
6 
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This issue was preserved in the trial court. See pp. 30-33 of the record. 
Issue #3: Did the trial court err in failing to set aside the default judgment against 
Defendant/Appellant Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, as such failure is contrary to Utah's 
strong policy of adjudicating matters on the merits, as opposed to the default process? 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion/Clear Error. Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 
UTAppl34,1fl9, 183 P.3d 1052. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See pp. 30-33 of the record. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In or around December 2002, Plaintiffs/Respondents (hereinafter, "Plaintiffs") 
purchased a Recreational Vehicle (hereinafter, "RV") from Wheelers RV Las Vegas from 
Defendant/Appellant's (hereinafter, "Defendant") predecessor in interest. (See pg. 2 of 
the record, TJ 7.) In or around December 2004, Defendant acquired the assets, but not the 
liabilities for prior sales, of Wheelers RV Las Vegas. (See pg. 121 of the record, ]f 3.) In 
the Fall of 2007, Defendant was served with a Complaint. (See pp. 1-15 of the record.) 
Plaintiffs allege that the RV sold to them was a "manufacturer's buyback" with a "history 
of problems". (See pg. 2 of the record, f 7.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that, although they 
were able to sell the subject RV, following that sale, the subject RV was found to be a 
"manufacturer's buyback" with a "history of problems", and that Plaintiffs were then 
obligated to re-purchase the RV, sustaining monetary damages. (See Pg. 3 of the record, 
1112-16.) 
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( 
Plaintiffs' counsel, without prior notification to general counsel for Defendant, and via 
mail, dispatched a Notice of Application for Entry of Default on or about November 27, 2007. i 
(See pg. 38 of the record, TJ 7.) Counsel for Defendant received that document on December 5, 
2007. (See pg. 38 of the record, \ 8.) By that time, Plaintiffs had already taken a Default 
Judgment against Defendant. (See pg. 38 of the record, \ 10.) On or about February 29, 2008, 
within the time period set forth by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60, filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Default, objecting specifically to personal jurisdiction, and thus, not consenting to jurisdiction. 
(See pg. 30-33 of the record generally.) The Court had the matter for oral argument in May 
2008, and the Court denied the motion in June 2008. (See pp. 68-74, 85-101, and 102-103 of 
the record generally.) 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon receipt of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant provided a copy to its general counsel, 
Sharon Nelson, in Nevada. (Ex. 3 generally, included in the Addendum to this Brief.) Ms. 
Nelson began a dialogue with Plaintiffs' counsel, in which numerous issues were raised; namely, 
that a misjoinder of parties had occurred due to the transfer of the ownership of the dealership in 
December 2004. (See pg. 38 of the record, ^ 4-7.) Based upon this exchange and others, 
Plaintiffs' counsel granted Defendant an open extension of time in which to file an Answer to the 
Complaint. (See pg. 38 of the record, 1} 5.) : 
Dialog continued between Defendant's general counsel in Nevada and Plaintiffs' counsel 
in Utah. (See pg. 38 of the record, fflf 4-7.) During that time, various documents were provided 
by Defendant's counsel to Plaintiffs' counsel. (See pg. 38 of the record, \ 5.) Each time 
8 
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documents were provided, Plaintiffs' counsel requested additional documentation. (See pg. 38 
of the record, ^ 4-7.) Plaintiffs' counsel requested one particular document, the purchase and 
sale agreement, without redactions pertaining to the financial condition of the parties to the 
purchase of the Wheelers RV Las Vegas, LLC dealership, despite the fact that the financial 
condition of the parties was wholly irrelevant. (See pg. 38 of the record, ^ 5-6.) In an effort 
to cooperate with Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendant was willing to provide the document in its 
entirety if Plaintiffs' counsel would sign a confidentiality agreement to keep the proprietary and 
private information pertaining to financial condition confidential. (See pg. 38 of the record, f^ 
6.) Plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign the agreement, and continued to insist upon the unredacted 
document. (See pg. 38 of the record, j^ 6.) 
Plaintiffs' counsel and general counsel for Defendant continued to attempt to work 
through their concerns via correspondence, mainly via facsimile. (See pg. 38 of the record, ^ 
4-7.) Plaintiffs' counsel, without prior notification to general counsel for Defendant, and via 
mail, without any phone call or email, dispatched a Notice of Application for Entry of Default on 
or about November 27, 2007, knowing that the document would be subject to out-of-state 
mailing during a peak holiday mailing period, and with an intervening weekend. (See pg. 38 of 
the record, f^ 7.) Counsel for Defendant did not receive the document until approximately 
December 5, 2007. (See pg. 38 of the record, |^ 8.) By that time, Plaintiffs had already taken a 
Default Judgment against Defendant, despite the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel never notified 
general counsel for Defendant that the open extension of time in which to answer had been 
rescinded. (See pg. 38 of the record, ]f 10.) 
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On February 29, 2008, within the time period set forth by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Default, objecting specifically to personal jurisdiction, 
among other things, and thus, not consenting to jurisdiction. (See pp. 30-33 generally.) The 
Court had the matter for oral argument in May 2008, and the Court denied the motion in June 
2008. (See pp. 68-74, 85-101, and 102-103 of the record generally.) 
V. 
.•:/•;•'• SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the outset of this case, and in every subsequent pleading, Defendant has 
disputed in personam jurisdiction. By appearing via a 60(b) Motion, Defendant did not 
submit to the jurisdiction of Utah courts. Defendant's 60(b) Motion was a special 
appearance because in personam jurisdiction was disputed in first and all subsequent 
pleadings. 
The Trial Court erred in failing to set aside the subject Default Judgment as it had 
no personal jurisdiction over Defendant to grant the Default Judgment in the first 
instance. At the time of its ruling on the subject Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
the Trial Court still lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant. In this regard, Defendant 
has never availed itself of the laws and benefits of the State of Utah. Further, Defendant 
has not had sufficient contacts with the State of Utah to warrant personal jurisdiction over 
it by Utah courts. Still further, Defendant is not the party who sold the RV to Plaintiffs. 
Defendant was acquired by its current owners approximately two years after the sale of 
the subject RV. Thus, any wrong committed by the sellers regarding the purchase and 
sale contract was committed, if at all, by some other person or persons. Thus, Plaintiffs 
10 
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have sued the wrong party, and have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal 
jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the Trial Court erred in failing to set aside the default judgment as 
the judgment was obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
In this regard, sometime in Fall 2007, Plaintiffs' counsel granted Sharon Nelson, Nevada 
counsel for Defendant, an open-ended extension in which to answer the Complaint. Ms. 
Nelson understood the phrase "open-ended extension" to mean exactly that. However, 
Plaintiffs' counsel mailed an Application for Entry of Default against Defendant without 
first informing Defendant that its extension of time within which to answer was being 
rescinded. Thus, Defendant's failure to answer the Complaint is excused by mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise and/or excusable neglect. 
Lastly, Utah has a strong policy of adjudicating matters on the merits, as opposed 
to the default process. Thus, the Trial Court erred when it denied Defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PURUSANT TO UTAH RULE 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)(4), BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS VOID 
FOR WANT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT 
At the outset of this case, and in Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, Defendant disputed in personam jurisdiction for the reasons that follow. By 
appearing via a 60(b) Motion, Defendant has not submitted to the jurisdiction of Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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courts. Defendant's 60(b) Motion was a special appearance because in personam 
jurisdiction was disputed in first and all subsequent pleadings. In the Affidavit of Sharon ' 
Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default, Ms. Nelson indicated that 
Defendant operates its business in Nevada, while Plaintiffs reside in Utah. (See pg. 39 of 
the record, f^ 16.) Further, Defendant does not purposefully avail itself to the benefits and 
laws of the state of Utah. (See pg. 39 of the record, ^ 16.) As general counsel for 
Defendant, Ms. Nelson's affidavit is evidence of the lack of any activities or otherwise 
that would give rise to personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 
On May 15, 2008, the Trial Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment. The Motion was brought on the grounds that the Trial Court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, among other grounds. In June 2008, the 
Trial Court denied the Motion. 
Personal jurisdiction over Defendant is lacking under the seminal cases of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297, Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 253, and Burger 
King v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478-482 and their progeny. Each of the aforementioned 
cases support Defendant's position that personal jurisdiction is lacking in this matter due to the 
lack of purposeful availment and significant contacts with the forum state. In other 
words, Defendant does not have a sufficient level of personal or business contacts with 
the State of Utah that it could reasonably expect to be sued there, nor has Defendant 
purposely availed itself of the resources or protection of the State of Utah. As will be 
shown below, the Trial Court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
matter offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See generally, 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. 310. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, Defendants World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., a regional distributor for Volkswagen, Inc. in New York, and Seaway 
Volkswagen, a dealership in New York, asked to be removed from the suit on the 
grounds that the forum state (Oklahoma) had no personal jurisdiction over them. The 
Court agreed, stating that because World-Wide and Seaway merely sold the vehicle in 
which the Plaintiff was injured, and they had done nothing to solicit the business of the 
out-of-state Plaintiff, the two corporations did not avail themselves of any of the 
privileges or benefits of Oklahoma law and thus, did not have minimum contacts in 
Oklahoma. 
Here, likewise, Defendant, a limited liability company, was formed in Minnesota, 
and is operated from a location in Nevada. Defendant was served with the Complaint at 
its business address is Nevada. Defendant conducts all of its business in the State of 
Nevada. The purchase and sale of the subject RV occurred in the State of Nevada. 
Defendant has never operated any retail or wholesale establishment in the State of Utah, 
nor did it solicit Plaintiffs' business via mail, television, radio, or any other manner in the 
State of Utah. Thus, as Defendant did not avail itself of the privileges of conducting 
business in the State of Utah, it does not have the requisite minimum contacts with Utah 
to give Utah courts personal jurisdiction over it in this matter. 
/ / / 
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( 
Additionally., Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) states, in applicable part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the j 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void; .... The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more 
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is 
ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce, 1986 UT LEXIS 862, 
Tfh 732 P.2d 92; Russell v. Marteli 1984 UT LEXIS 757, fL 681 P.2d 1193: Baker v. 
Western Sur. Co.. 1988 UT App. LEXIS 112, Tf8, 757 P.2d 878. However, when a motion 
to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, "the district court has no 
discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs." State of Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Vijil 
1989 UT LEXIS 95,1J6, 784 P.2d 1130. Here, the Trial Court's denial of Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is void due to its lack of personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant. 
In or around December 2002, Plaintiffs purchased the subject RV from 
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest. The current owner of Defendant acquired the assets 
of Defendant, from Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, in or around December 2004. 
However, the purchase of those assets did not include the assumption of any liability for 
previous sales from the prior owners. Because Defendant did not own the subject 
dealership when Plaintiffs purchased the RV, any alleged wrongdoing by Defendant's 
14 
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predecessor-in-interest, including any liability for prior sales, is not attributable to 
Defendant. Thus, Plaintiff has sued the wrong party. 
As the Trial Court's default judgment was rendered without personal jurisdiction 
over Defendant, it was void. Therefore, the Trial Court's failure to set aside that default 
judgment was in error. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b)(1), BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS 
OBTAINED THROUGH MISTAKE, INADVERTANCE, SURPRISE, AND/OR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was brought on the grounds that the 
default judgment rendered by the Trial Court was obtained through mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect, among other grounds. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) states, in applicable part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect.... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Here, the Trial Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment was in error as it was obtained based upon a mistake, surprise, 
and the excusable neglect of Defendant. Additionally, Defendant filed its Motion within 
three months after the Default Judgment was entered. 
/ / / 
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Excusable neglect is "the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent 
person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 1987 Utah * 
LEXIS 643,114, 733 P.2d 130. To demonstrate that a Default Judgment was due to 
excusable neglect, "[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he 
was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Black's 
Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't 1999 UT App 330, ^ 10, 991 P.2d 607 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, -
431 (1973)). In order to establish excusable neglect, "a party must provide the court with 
specific details that demonstrate due diligence in spite of uncontrollable circumstances." 
Stevens v. LaVerkin City 2008 UT App 129427, 183 P.3d 1059. 
As stated above, upon receipt of the Complaint, Defendant provided a copy to its 
general counsel in Nevada, Sharon Nelson. Ms. Nelson began a dialogue with Plaintiffs' 
counsel in winch numerous issues were raised; namely, that a misjoinder of parties had 
occurred due to the transfer of the dealership in December 2004. Based upon this 
exchange and others, in Fall 2007, Plaintiffs' counsel granted Sharon Nelson an open-
ended extension in which to answer the Complaint. Ms. Nelson understood the phrase 
"open-ended extension" to mean that Defendant did not yet have to answer the Complaint 
until the parties resolved the issue of who should have been sued, or at least, until 
Plaintiffs' counsel notified her that the extension of time was no longer "open". 
Dialog continued between Ms. Nelson in Nevada and Plaintiffs' counsel in Utah. 
During that time, various documents were provided by Defendant to Plaintiffs. Each time 
16 
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documents were provided, Plaintiffs' counsel requested additional documentation. 
Plaintiffs' counsel requested one particular document, the purchase and sale agreement, 
without redactions pertaining to the financial condition of the parties to the purchase of 
the Wheelers RV Las Vegas, LLC dealership, despite the fact that the financial condition 
of the parties was wholly irrelevant In an effort to cooperate with Plaintiffs' counsel, 
Defendant was willing to provide the document in its entirety if Plaintiffs' counsel would 
sign a confidentiality agreement to keep the proprietary and private information pertaining to 
financial condition confidential. Plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign the agreement, and continued 
to insist upon the unredacted document. 
Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendant's general counsel continued to attempt to work through 
their concerns via correspondence, mainly via facsimile. However, on or about November 27, 
2007, without prior notification to Defendant's general counsel, and via mail only. Plaintiffs' 
counsel dispatched a Notice of Application for Entry of Default, knowing that the document 
would be subject to out-of-state mailing during a peak holiday mailing period, and with an 
intervening weekend. Defendant's counsel did not receive the document until approximately 
December 5, 2007. By that time, Plaintiffs had already taken a Default Judgment against 
Defendant, despite the fact that Plaintiffs' counsel never notified Defendant's general 
counsel that the open extension of time in which to answer the Complaint had been 
rescinded. 
In Olsen v. Cummings 1977 UT LEXIS 1172, 565 P.2d 1123, the Court was asked 
to consider whether the trial court erred in denying a Motion to Vacate a default 
judgment, made under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), where the Motion was timely made. The Court 
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noted that Plaintiffs had granted an open-ended extension to Defendants to answer the 
complaint. Some time later, defense counsel unilaterally revoked the extension. Shortly 
thereafter, new defense counsel came into the case, and not knowing of the extension, 
and assuming prior defense counsel had answered the complaint, failed to file an answer. 
The Court vacated the default judgment and remanded the case to the trial court stating 
that "although a trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in granting 
or denying a motion to vacate a final judgment, it cannot act arbitrarily it is quite 
uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely 
application is made to set it aside." Citations. Olsen v. Cummings, supra, 1977 UT 
LEXIS 1172. 
Here, similarly, an open-ended extension of time was granted to Defendant to 
answer the Complaint. However, in this case, that open extension was never revoked or 
rescinded. Instead, Plaintiffs' counsel decided just to send to Defendant a Notice of 
Application for Entry of Default. Defendant was completely surprised by Plaintiffs' counsel's 
actions. (See pg. 39 of the record, ffl[ 12-13.) However, Defendant timely filed its Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment on the grounds that its failure to answer the Complaint was excusable, 
and that the Default Judgment was obtained through surprise, and by the mistake of Defendant in 
believing that Plaintiffs' counsel had truly granted it an open extension, as he had said. (See pg. 
39 of the record, f 14.) 
/ / / • • . • 
- . - •
 U l 
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Plaintiff should have been estopped from entry of default due to the open 
extension of time granted to Defendant by Plaintiffs' counsel, and Plaintiffs' counsel's 
failure to timely advise Defendant, or to advise Defendant at all, of the rescission of his 
agreement to grant an open extension of time to answer the Complaint. 
C THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE FAILURE TO DO 
SO WAS CONTRARY TO UTAH'S STRONG POLICY OF ADJUDICATING 
MATTERS ON THE MERITS, AS OPPOSED TO THE DEFAULT PROCESS 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was brought on the grounds that the 
Default Judgment rendered by the Trial Court was in error as it was contrary to Utah's 
clearly-established policy of adjudicating matters on the merits, as opposed to the default 
process. At least as early as 1909 courts have stated that, although the matter of setting 
aside defaults is within the discretion of the trial courts, Utah's general rule is to bring 
about a judgment on the merits. Utah Courts are generally in accord with the doctrine that 
"the courts should be liberal in granting relief against judgments taken by default to the 
end that controversies may be tried on the merits." State of Utah v. Musselman, 1983 UT 
LEXIS 1086,1J5, 667 P.2d 1053; Ouealv v. Willardson, 1909 UT LEXIS 32, Tfl 1, 100 P. 
930 ("In all doubtful cases the general rule of courts is to incline towards granting relief 
from the default and to bring about a judgment on the merits."). 
The Quealy court stated further that, "while courts have a right to require all 
litigants to come into court and to present their claims and defenses in accordance with 
the law and rules of procedure, and in case of inexcusable neglect to refuse them a 
hearing, still these rules should be enforced so as to reflect justice between the parties to 
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the action and for the purpose of vindicating the law and maintaining the dignity of the 
court." Ouealv v. Willardson, supra, 1909 UT LEXIS 32, ffi[l 5, 16. "Judgments by 
default are not favored by the courts nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play." 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 1962 UT LEXIS 250, f5,14 Utah 2d 60. 
Here, as stated above, Defendant's failure to answer the complaint was excusable. 
Thus, even more reason was had to vacate the Default Judgment so as to "reflect justice 
between the parties" and to "[vindicate] the law and [maintain] the dignity of the court." 
The Trial Court's failure to set aside the Default Judgment was in error as 
Defendant's failure to answer the Complaint was excusable and Utah's policy of granting 
relief from a default on such grounds mandated the setting aside of a Default taken under 
such conditions. 
/// 
/ / / 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in failing to set aside the subject Default Judgment as 
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a proper basis for personal jurisdiction in the State of 
Utah and have sued the wrong party. Additionally, the Default Judgment was obtained 
through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect as Defendant's open 
extension in which to answer the Complaint was not timely rescinded by Plaintiffs. 
Finally, Utah has a strong policy of adjudicating matters on the merits, as opposed to the 
default process. Thus, the Trial Court erred when it denied Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter 
DATED: December <S ,2008 T ^ > - < " ^ P ^ U j ^ c £ ? 
DANIEL P. WILDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 1: Complaint - filed in or about August 2007 
Exhibit 2: Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Request for 
Hearing - filed February 29, 2008 
Exhibit 3: Affidavit of Sharon Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure - filed 
February 29, 2008 
Exhibit 4: Affidavit of William E. Frazier in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
-filedFebruary 29, 2008 
Exhibit 5: Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order regarding 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, which was ultimately 
the Court's final ruling - Filed June 25, 2008 
Exhibit 6: Defendant/Appellant's Statement of Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 11 (g) - filed on July 25, 2008 
Exhibit 6(A): A true and correct copy of Defendant's [Proposed] Order regarding 
its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment which was filed on 
February 29, 2008, but was subsequently discarded by the Court 
because the Court used Plaintiffs' [Proposed] Order instead 
Exhibit 6(B): Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Order regarding 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, which was 
ultimately the Court's final ruling - Filed June 25, 2008 
Exhibit 7: Defendant/Appellant's Certificate of Non-request of Transcripts or 
Proceedings Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(1) - filed 
on July 25, 2008 
Exhibit 8: Defendant/Appellant's Request for Stay of Default Judgment and 
Determination of Amount Payable to Court for Security Purposes in Lieu of 
Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to URCP 62, or in the Alternative, Request for 
Supersedeas Bond, and Request for Hearing - filed October 2, 2008 
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Exhibit 9: Defendant's [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant's Request for Stay of 
Execution of Default Judgment, Determination of Amount Payable for 
Security Purposes in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to URCP 62, or in 
the Alternative, Request for Supersedeas Bond - filed October 2, 2008 
Exhibit 10: Affidavit of Brent Moody in Support of Defendant's Request for Stay of 
Execution on Default Judgment and Deterination of Amount Payable to 
Court for Security Purposes in Lieu of Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to 
URCP 62, or in the Alternative, Request for Supersedeas Bond - filed 
October 2, 2008 
Exhibit 10(A): Defendant's Financial Operating Report to support Defendant's 
Request for Stay of Execution of Default Judgment, Determination 
of Amount Payable for Security Purposes in Lieu of Supersedeas 
Bond Pursuant to URCP 62, or in the Alternative, Request for 
Supersedeas Bond 
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GARY G. ICUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
Gary G. Kuhlmann (#4994) 
Attorney fw Plaintiffs 
H 3 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 910387 
St George, Utah 84793 ,; " ' , 
Telephone: (435)656-6156 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE. OF UTAH 
) 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA '; ) 
JUDSON, husband and wife, ) 
) COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) • • -
v. ) CiyilNo. 
) 
WHEBLER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a ) 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, ) Judge 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, ) 
) ; : • 
Defendant. ) 
Plaintiffs, far their Complaint against the Defendant, complain and allege as follows; 
1. Plaintiffs are residents of Washington County, Utah. 
2. Defendant is a Minnesota limited liability company doing business as Wheeler's 
Las Vegas RV in Clark County, Nevada. 
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and venue over 
this matter 
4. During 2002, the Plaintiff mot with the Defendant to discuss purchasing a 2000 
Journey RV, VIN No. 4UZ6XPBC5YCG43267 (the "RV"). 
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5. After such discussion, the Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the Defendant 
to purchase the RV for the sum of S124.527.50, 
6. As port of the purchase of the RV, the Plaintiffs traded in another recreational 
vehicle with which resulted in a net trade-in allowance of $23,597,00. Plaintiffs also paid to 
Defendant a down payment of $7,500'. Based thereon, Plaintiffs were required to obtain a loan 
of $95,900.00 for the remaining purchase .price for the RV. Documents evidencing tbs purchase 
of the RVby Plaintiffs are attached hereto as Exhibit A md by referenoe incorporated herein: 
7. At no time during the negotiation or sale of the RV to Plaintiffs did the Defendant 
inform the Plaintiffs that there was any history of problems with the RV nor that the RV had 
been a manufacturer's buybaok vehicle, 
8. At no time during the negotiation or sate of the RV to Plaintiffs did the Defendant 
execute or deliver to the Plaintiffs a written disclosure of flic buyback status of the RV as 
required by state and federal law, nor obtain the Plaintiffs' acknowledgment of such notice. 
9. At no time during the negotiation or sale of Che RV to Plaintiffs did the Defendant 
deliver t:o the Plaintiffs a written disclosure that the title to the RV would be permanently 
inscribed with the notation uLemon Law Buyback" as required by state and federal law, 
10. At no time did the Defendant place a doca) on the left doorframe of the RV stating 
that the RV was a "Lemon Law Buyback" as required by state and federal law, 
11. As part of the purchase of the RV, the only document which the Defendant 
presented to the Plaintiffs, without discussion or disclosure, wa6 a limited warranty for 
repurchased vehicles, a true and correct copy of which id attached hereto as Exhibit B. However, 
2 
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the Defendant did not disclose to the Plaintiffs the fact that the RV was a manufacturer1* 
buybaofc, nor did the Defendant execute the dealer portion of the limited wau'anty. 
12. After several years, the Plaintiffs decided to sell the RV and placed the same on 
consignment with Hurricane Valley Auto Mall in Hurricane, Utah. 
13.' The RV was subsequently sold item the Hurricane Valley Auto Mall lot. At the 
time of such sale, the Plaintiffs were required to pay the sum of $6,000,00 to pay the learning -.!. 
lien on the RV and provide clear title. 
14. Shortly after the sale of the RV from the Hurricane Valley Auto Mall lot, demand 
was made upon Hurricane Valley Auto Mall to repurchase the vehicle since the fact that the RV 
was a manufacturer's buybaek had not heen disclosed at the time the RV was sold under the 
consignment. 
15. Based upon such notice and demand, Hurricane Valley Auto Mall demanded that 
the Plaintiffs repurchase the RV from Hurricane Valley for the same amount which Hurricane 
Valley was required to pay to repurchase the RV. This w$$ the first time the Plaintiffs were ever 
informed of the status of the RV as a manufacturer' s buybaek. 
16. In order to repurchase the ,RV, the Plaintiffs were requited to pay a down payment 
of $6r100.00 and obtain a loan in the sum of $84,700.00. Based upon such loan, the Plaintiff* 
have been required to make monthly payments of $849.62 since December 2006, 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
{Breach of .Contracts 
17. PlaintifJb incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 16 above as if fkdly 
set forth herein, 
3 
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18. Under the terms of the agreement between the parties, Defendant was to deliver to 
Plaintiffs clean title to the RV to the Plaintiff 
19, Defendant breached its express and implied obligations under the agreement by 
acting in bad faith, not disclosing the defects in the title for the RV and not providing the 
Plaintiffs with a clean title to the RV. 
• . • 20. - Defendant's breach ofthe agreement hae caused damage to the Plaintiffs in an 
amount to be proven at trial, and including the lost value ofthe Plaintiffs'' trade-in vehicle, 
amounts paid by Plaintiffs for the loan on the RV, payment Co sell the RV through Hurricane 
Valley, coste to finance the repurchase ofthe RV, monthly payments made by the Plaintiffs due 
to the Defendant's breach, and costs and attorney fees incurred by the Plaintiffs in an amoimt of 
no less than $147,274.08. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
21. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 20 above as if fully 
set forth herein, 
22. As a material part ofthe negotiations between the parties, Defendant represented 
to the Plaintiffs that the title to tho RV was not branded, 
23. At the time of tli e representations, Defendant knew or had reason to know that 
such statements were false, or had complete disregard for whether the representations were true 
or not. 
24. The representations made by Defendant to the Plaintiffs were made by Defendant 
in order Lu deceit the Plaintiffs and cause them to ontor into the transaction with Defendant, 
4 
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25. The Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendant's misrepresentations and entered 
into the agreement with Defendant based thereon, 
26. Due to the misrepresentations, and in order to protect their interests, Plaintiffs 
have been required to incur indebtedness and make payments (hereon substantially in excess of 
the actual value of the RV and have been required to retain an attorney to seek damages caused 
by the.Defendant1 A misrepresentations. This bas caused Plaintiffs damages and increased 
expenses in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount of no less than SI 47,274.08, 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
ftfcelieftpt MfargnrftsenfotM 
27, PlaintifB incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 26 above as if fully 
set forth herein. • 
28, As a material part of the negotiations between the parties, Defendant represented 
to the Plaintiffs that the title to the RV was not branded. 
29, The Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendant's misrepresentations andentorod 
into the agreement with Defendant based thereon. 
30. Due to the misrepresentations, and in order to protect their interests, Plaintiffs 
have been required to incur indebtedness and make payments thereon substantially in exoesa of 
the actual value of the RV and have been, required to retain an attorney to seek damages caused 
by the Defendant's misrepresentations. This has caused Plaintiffs damages and increased 
expenses in an amount to be proven at trial, but in an amount of no leas than $147,274.08, 
s 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
rVfftlttCion of State_attd Jfedteral Law) 
31, Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 30 above as if fully 
set forth herein. 
32, State and federal law requires that in the sale of a vehicle which qualifies as a 
manufacturer's buybaok, the dealer must 
a. execute and deliver to the purchaser at the time of sale a notice that the 
vehicle being sold is a manufacturer^ buybaclc and obtain the purchaser's acknowledgment of 
such notice; 
b. deliver to the purchaser and have the purchaser execute a written 
disclosure regarding the manufacturer's repurchase of the vehicle and notifying the purchaser 
that the title for such vehicle will be permanently inscribed with die notati on "Lemon Law 
Buyback;" and 
c. affix a deal to the left front doorframe specifying that the certificate of title 
for the vehicle is inscribed with the notation "Lemon Law Buyback." 
33. Defendant failed to comply with any of these requirements in connection with the 
sale of the RV to the Plaintiffs. 
34. Defendant's failure to comply with its statutory obligations has damaged 
Plaintiffs in an amount to be proven at trial, and no less than $147,274,08. 
6 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
fPnnjlttvc .Damages.) 
35. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 34 above as if fully 
set forth herein. 
36. Despite Defendant's obligations to do otherwise, Defendant failed to comply with 
the terms of the parties* agreement, fraudulently misrepresented facts to the Plaintiffs in order to 
induce (hem into an agreement with Defendant, and failed to comply with statutory 
requirements, 
37. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wiUM, malicious, reckless, aud 
blatant disregard for the rights and interests of Hie Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have incurred and will 
continue to incur damages, 
38. Defendant should be ordered to pay punitive damages to the Plarnviflft in an 
amount reasonable in the premises. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Court ©ncer a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against Defendant as follows: 
c 1. For damages in an amount proven at trial and no less than $147,274.08 for 
Defendant's breach of contract 
2. For damages in an amount proven-at trial and no less than $147,274.08 :fbr 
Defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations. 
3, For damages in m amount proven at trial and no leas than $'147,274,08 for 
Defendant's negligent misrepresentations. 
7 
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4, For damages in an amount proven at trial and no less than $147,274,08 for 
Defendant's failure to comply with statutory requirements. 
5, For punitive damages in an amount reasonable under the circumstances. 
6. For Plaintiffs* costs and attorney fees inclined herein; and 
7. For such other and farther relief a$ the Court deems just 
•wi^f^O 
DATED tbifl/^1 flay of August, 2007, 
Attorneyjfcr Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff address?: 
30 Red Bluff Drive 
Hurricane, Utah 84737 
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EXHIBIT A 
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STEVEN R. BANGERTER (Utah Bar No. 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS YEGAS, LLC 
^ '•'!'•• '•MM"; ,ii:; )|-"IAL DISTRICT Ob WASHINGTON COUNTS 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DON N A 
JUDSON. husband and wife. 
) JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) HEARING 
vs. < 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS. LLC-, a I 
Nevada foreign limited liabilit> company < .MI No.: 070501867 
dba WHEELER'S LAS YEGAS RV. > 
) 
) .Tin1«>c: Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendant. I 
) 
COMES NOW Defendant, WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, by and through its 
attorneys, Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter. and moves the court to set aside the default 
judgment entered against it on or abou: .jcjemoe: '•. - '• . 
This Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This motion is supported by the attached affidavits of Sharon Nelson and William E. 
FILED 
FEE ? ' 2008 
V v , . . 
i 
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Frazier, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities below, the court filings to date, and any oral 
argument pertaining to this Motion. 
M E M P K - A M U M OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION! D SET ASIDE DEI AULT ' 
' " '
:
 . • • I . ' ' • " • . 
SETTING ASIIM II11 DEEMI'I INT THE INSTANT CASE IS PERMISSIBLE UN?7>I R 
Rule 60(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sen forth, in pertinent part: 
(b) On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, 
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Here, as set forth in the Affidavit oi Sharon Nelson in Support of this 
Motion the subject judgment was issued subsequent to mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, and excusable neglect. The Affidavit of Sharon Nelson is hereby 
9 
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incorporated by reference, Pursuant to Rule 60(b), this Motior is brought within 
tliree months of entry of judgment,, which occurred or o. n> > > -; •:.-jy\^v 5. 
2007. 
Rule 60(B) has been consistently interpreted by me I •tan Supreme Court 
and Cou:\ J. .-p,\ :. u ;^:u:. • .. ^ "^  .* •• •'*'•:•!> . ; ^rant relief from 
default judgments in instances where there has been no undue delay, the judgment 
was a result of mistake or inadvertence, and the interests of justice wi. mid he 
served by granting the requested relief "The rule that the courts will incline 
towards granting relief to a party who has not had the opportunity to present his 
case, is oiuij.a: /one. .. ' *. '" •* .•*..- • ' S;.v/< -/"V;an v. D. John 
Musselman and Linda Ann Coram (v':0S?j 667 P.2c \()55 and Mnl: 1983 Utah 
LEXIS 1086. 
"Where any reasonable excuse is offered by defaulting party, courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from a default judgment, unless it appears 
lli:ii to d" si» would rcsul! in substantial injustice to the adverse party." 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co, v. Paul W, Lars en Contractor (1975), 544 P.2d 
876. 
I-h-rc. trie interests of justice would be met by granting this Motion to Set 
Aside Default. The evidence will show that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party. 
Defendant attempted to demonstrate this to Plaintiffs' counsel, but Plaintiffs' 
counsel proceeded with securing a default judgment anyway. Defendants did not 
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own the subject dealership when Plaintiffs purchased the recreationa: vehicle. 
Further, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a propt IUV-A- f- '.v-•:.;•! 
jurisdiction. 1 defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not the proper party, 
and that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly 
questionable under the -,,"i. •: •;il -c::s:^ " ; ;':/.•*"'.•;.'. ///,;' .SV;oc Co. v. M ' ashwgIon 
(1945) 326-U.S. 310, 3 16. Wond-Widc Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 4^4 
'U.S.2%6,297, Hanson v. JH-nciuc; ( i^ .M.v .> . :\ ..:. a:-,d ''.irvc?- Vim: v. 
' Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478-482 and their progeny. Each of the 
aforementioned cases support Defendant's position that personal j arisdiction is 
lacking in this matter due to the lack of purposeful availment and significant 
contacts with the forum state, 
n. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that the Default 
Judgment entered against n mi oi about December 5, 2007 be set aside, due to 
mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, and surprise. Defendant has legitimate 
and valid legal deienses. including misjoinder and lack ofpersonnl jurisdiction. 
This motion is made in accordance with Rule 60(B), and the case law spawned 
thereby. 
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REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Defendant hereby requests a hearing be scheduler or. O:o > .oliop to Sol 'vsidi' 1 kTaul 
Judgment. 
DATED this 29th day of February, 2008. 
A W ' ii-TirHS OF STEVEN R. BANGERTER 
w.y~ 
William E. Frazier 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
Steven R. Bangerter (State Bar No. 10051) 
William E. Frazier (State Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 S. River Rd., Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorney for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Washington County Hall of Justice, 200 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 84770 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA JUDSON, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada 
foreign limited liability company, dba 
WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON NELSON IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT PURSUANT 
TO RULE 60(B) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A, Ludlow 
I, SHARON NELSON, DECLARE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing in the State of Nevada. I am general counsel for 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC in Nevada. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the contents of this affidavit, and if called as a witness, 
could testify competently thereto. 
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3. It is my understanding that the subject complaint was served upon WHEELER RV LAS 
VEGAS, LLC sometime in late 2007. 
4. Sometime in the fall of 2007,1 contacted Plaintiffs' counsel to inform him that the 
company he sued was not the company from which his clients purchased their 
recreational vehicle, explaining that the dealership had changed ownership. 
5. Based upon our conversation, certain documentation was requested by Plaintiffs' counsel, 
which I provided. During the exchange of documentation, it was understood that _ 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC would be given an open extension to answer. 
6. Despite the fact that the amount of money involved in the exchange between the prior 
dealership group (from which Plaintiffs purchased their recreational vehicle) and the new 
ownership group (Defendants) is wholly irrelevant to this proceeding, Plaintiffs' counsel 
demanded this information, and refused to sign a confidentiality agreement to cover any 
unredacted portions of documents pertaining to amounts paid for the dealership. 
1. Despite the fact that I continued to speak with Plaintiffs' counsel regarding the confusion 
of identities of the proper Defendant, Plaintiffs' counsel mailed an Application foi Entry 
of Default against WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC. 
8. I did not receive the Application for Entry of Default until approximately December 5, 
2007, due to an intervening weekend and out-of-state mailing. 
9. Immediately upon my receipt of the Application for Entry of Default, I endeavored to 
retain Utah counsel eventually locating the Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter. 
10. Unfortunately, I learned that Default was entered against WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, 
LLC in the short period of time between the Application for Entry of Default Judgment 
and my retention of the Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON NELSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
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11. The evidence in this matter will show that the present owners of WHEELER RV LAS 
VEGAS, LLC did not acquire liabilities such as the claim of Plaintiffs, and that the 
proper Defendants are the prior owners of the dealership. 
12. The Default entered against WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS was surprising, given the 
ongoing nature of conversations I had with Plaintiffs counsel regarding the issue of 
joinder of proper parties. 
13.1 believed that the issue would be resolved short of litigation due to the fact that Plaintiffs 
purchased their recreational vehicle in 2002, and the sale of the dealership occurred at the 
end of 2004. 
14. Default was entered against WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS as a result of a 
misunderstanding between myself and opposing counsel, inadvertence, mistake, and/or 
surprise. 
15.1 have been advised by Utah counsel that valid legal defenses exist; namely, problems 
related to the joinder of the proper Defendant. It is anticipated that this deficit will be 
addressed through a 12(b) Motion to Dismiss. 
16.1 am also advised that there are significant personal jurisdictional issues as well; namely, 
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated with sufficient particularity the basis for personal 
jurisdiction. Defendant operates its business in Nevada, while Plaintiffs reside in Utah. 
Defendant does not purposely avail itself to the benefits and laws of the state of Utah. As 
such, a 12(b) Motion to Dismiss on this subject is anticipated in the event that the default 
is set aside. 
17.1 sincerely apologize to the court for misunderstanding the intent of Plaintiffs' counsel. I 
acted as quickly as possible upon receipt of notification that Plaintiffs' counsel intended 
AFFIDAVIT OF SHARON NELSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
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to seek a Default Judgment. Due to delays with the mail, and the nature of out-of-state 
mail mailed from St. George, Utah, by the time I received the Application for Entry of 
Default Judgment and retained counsel, the Judgment was entered. 
Dated: Qj fr8/0% Signecr ^ < 
SHARON NELSON 
State of I^HcJU^ 
County of rCl^-rlc 
Sharon Nelson, appeared before me this SIS day of £chru*^u 2008, and proved 
to me her identity in the form of a D r i W ^ Uizpj&t-. . After being sworn and while under oath, 
Sharon Nelson stated that she had read this document, understood the contents, and that the contents 
were true of her own personal knowledge. Sharon Nelson then signed this document in my 
presence. 
' "fgft 
CefefcGrcuti 
tioiani fvbk I 
fSllllP StauGffita'sda I 
\. % * d g g S & ' ®&te SvvmXvrt 'l?p Avjurt 20,2C03 \ 
fr^SP^ Certificate 9(p: 04-914014 3 
'iMTA 
Notary Public 
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Steven R. Bangerter (State Bar No. 10051) 
William E. Frazier (State Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 S. River Rd., Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 CIl CR 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 F I L LL U 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964
 r r n n 
FEB 2 9 2008 
Attorney for Defendant, FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC WASHINGTON COUNTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Washington County Hall of Justice, 200 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 84770 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA JUDSON, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada 
foreign limited liability company, dba 
WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM E. FRAZIER 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
I, WILLIAM E. FRAZIER, DECLARE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. I am an attorney in good standing in the State of Utah. I was retained in mid-December 
2007 to represent WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the contents of this affidavit, and if called as a witness, 
could testify competently thereto. 
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3. After I was retained, I contacted Plaintiffs' counsel. After some delay in connecting with 
him, I learned in January 2008 that he had in fact secured a default judgment against 
Defendant. 
4. I discussed the possibility of setting aside the default judgment via stipulation due to the 
apparent misjoinder of parties, explaining the nature of transfers between the prior owner 
of WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS and the new owners. 
5. Plaintiffs' counsel indicated that he required unredacted documents demonstrating a non-
transfer of liability, including all financial details of the transfer. 
6. During my conversation with Plaintiffs' counsel, he indicated that he did not want to sign 
the confidentiality agreement originally proposed by Attorney Sharon Nelson to keep the 
financial details of the transaction confidential. 
7. I contacted the office of Plaintiffs' counsel again on February 27, 2008, offering to 
provide a redacted agreement regarding the non-transfer of liability and proceeding to set 
aside this default by stipulation. I have received no response to my call. 
8. A review of the file indicates that substantial valid legal defenses exist, including 
misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction, among others. 
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9. Based upon my review of the file and correspondence, it appears that the timing of the 
events of this matter, and the discussions between Plaintiffs' Nevada counsel, as well as 
delays in the receipt of the Application for Entry of Default Judgment, resulted in a 
Default Judgment that was the result of inadvertence, mistake, surprise, and excusable 
neglect. 
zb/o. Dated: HOT/Ofr Signed: ty'^ / ^ 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER 
State of UTAty 
County o f ^ W A g f f ^ G q T O (4 
William E. Frazier, appeared before me this 7-8 day of f-ehYlAjkY'Lj 2008, and 
proved to me his identity in the form of a [AT t) )y • After being sworn and while under 
oath, William E. Frazier stated that ftie had read this document, understood the contents, and that the 
contents were true of his own personal knowledge. William E. Frazier then signed this document in 
my presence. 
? P K |ft «» » w W »i 
! /f l!S38\ Notary Public J 
» J $ 2 S S ^ KARA LYNN WARD • 
Ira/ l l ^ ^ U « n0 6l R l w M" 8U»' A-200 I 
ill Proffl Ml 8i- &wrp, UT M7W J j | \ j | « ( My GommiftMlwn Expiree
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GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
Gary G. Kuhlmann (#4994) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
107 South 1470 East, Suite 105 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, Utah 84791-0387 
Telephone: (435)656-6156 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
2003 JU^ | .V# j {., 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS'dB&afiQSHB FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
Civil No. 070501867 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
The plaintiffs hereby submit their proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order regarding the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and respectfully request 
that the Court adopt such findings, conclusions and order. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 15, 2008, on defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment. The Court reviewed the motion, the opposition thereto, the 
affidavits supporting the motion and opposition, and the file herein. The Court also heard and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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considered the arguments of counsel at the hearing on May 15, 2008. Based thereon, the Court 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Complaint in the above-captioned matter was filed on August 16, 2007, and 
was served upon the defendant on August 30, 2007. 
2. The Complaint was served upon the defendant on August 20, 2007. 
3. . During September, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel was contacted by Sharon Nelson, 
attorney for the defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer the Complaint. 
4. During such conversation, Ms. Nelson informed plaintiffs' counsel that the 
dealership at issue had changed ownership and that the defendant was not responsible for the 
plaintiffs' claims in this case. 
5. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension to allow her a short 
time to provide plaintiffs' counsel with evidence that the defendant was not the proper party in 
this case. 
6. After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson for some time, 
plaintiffs' counsel's office contacted Ms. Nelson's office by phone on October 15, 2007, and 
demanded that the requested information be provided or an Answer filed. 
7. On October 30, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a fax from Ms. Nelson 
containing only a Bill of Sale which was apparently part of a larger contract. 
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8. On that same date, plaintiffs' counsel's office responded to Ms. Nelson's fax and 
informed her that to evaluate the matter, plaintiffs counsel would need to receive the entire 
agreement and other documents related to the alleged sale of the dealership. 
9. On November 1, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a second fax from Ms. Nelson 
requiring that plaintiffs' counsel sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents 
would be provided. 
10. Plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was the . 
defendant that was requesting that the defendant be dismissed from the case and because to do so 
could prejudice the plaintiff in using the information in the purchase documents in this case. 
11. After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms. 
Nelson, on November 27, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel advised Ms. Nelson that plaintiffs would be 
seeking the entry of default and default judgment. 
12. An Application for Entry of Default, and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
were filed with the court on November 27, 2007. 
13. A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment 
was entered on December 4, 2007. 
14. Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default 
judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant's 
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default. 
15. On December 19, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a phone call from William 
Frazier, the new attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked plaintiffs' counsel if he would be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
willing to stipulate to set aside the Default Judgment based upon his assertion that his client had 
purchased the business after the plaintiffs purchase of the motorhome at issue. 
16. While plaintiffs' counsel refused to simply stipulate to set aside the Default 
Judgment without some additional evidence, plaintiffs' counsel informed Mr. Frazier of 
plaintiffs' counsel's continuing willingness to review any documents he would like to provide. 
17." At the end of the conversation, Mr. Frazier informed plaintiffs' counsel that he 
would be obtaining, and would provide plaintiffs' counsel with, documentation to show that Mr.. 
Frazier's client was not the proper defendant in this matter. 
18. Despite being told again that plaintiffs' counsel would be provided certain 
documents by the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel received no further documents and had no further 
contact from the defendant's attorney until February 27, 2008. 
19. On February 27, 2008, plaintiffs' counsel received a voice-mail message from 
defendant's counsel simply indicating that defendant would be filing a motion seeking to set 
aside the Default Judgment in this case. 
20. The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed with the Court 
on February 29, 2008, four days shy of three months from the date of entry of the Default 
Judgment. 
21. The defendant was afforded over three months to provide the plaintiffs with the 
documents requested by plaintiffs or to file an Answer in this case. 
22. The only statements provided to the Court to demonstrate a meritorious defense to 
this action by the defendant are the conclusory statements of defendant's counsel that: 
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a. "The evidence will show that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party." See 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment at p. 3. 
b. Defendants (sic) did not own the subject dealership when the Plaintiffs 
purchased the recreational vehicle." Id. at p. 4. 
- c. v Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not that proper party, and 
that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly questionable. . . ." Id. 
From the foregoing, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To be relieved from the Default Judgment, defendant must show: (a) that the 
motion for relief from the judgment was filed within three months of the entry of the judgment; 
(b) that mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect were present; and (c) that the 
defendant has a meritorious defense to the action. See URCP 60(b). 
2. "Excusable neglect" is "the existence of'due diligence5 by a reasonably prudent 
person under similar circumstances." Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, \ 27. 
3. To show excusable neglect "the movant must show that he has used due diligence 
and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. .. . 
[A] party must provide the court with specific details that demonstrate due diligence in spite of 
uncontrollable circumstances" Id. 
4. "A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed 
facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered. 
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Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny the truth of plaintiff s allegations; 
he must set forth specific facts showing meritorious defenses to those allegations in order to have 
the default judgment set aside." State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1057 - 1058 (Utah 1983). 
5. Defendant has asserted no basis for finding the existence of mistake or 
inadvertence in this case but rather relies on the claims of excusable neglect and surprise. 
6. Defendant did not exercise due diligence in this matter since an answer could 
have been filed by the defendant at anytime during the more than three months between that date 
the Complaint was served and the date the default was entered. Nothing prevented the defendant 
from filing such Answer and there were no circumstances outside the control of the defendant 
which rendered the defendant unable to file an Answer. An Answer was not filed simply because 
the defendant chose not to do so. Based thereon, the defendant has failed to show the existence 
of excusable neglect in this case. 
7. The defendant has further failed to establish the existence of surprise. 
Defendant's counsel was told that only a short time would be given to provide the documents 
requested by plaintiffs' counsel and defendant failed to provide such documents. Further, the 
defendant was informed that the plaintiff was seeking a default and a copy of the Application for 
Entry of Default was provided to defendant's counsel. Nevertheless, no action was taken by 
defendant to prevent or overcome a default being entered until almost three months after the 
default judgment was entered. 
8. The defendant has failed to provide the Court with any "specific and sufficiently 
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
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entered." Thus, even if the Court were to find the existence of a mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect or surprise, the defendant's motion is deficient and should be denied. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters 
the following: 
ORDER 
1. The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is denied. 
2. The plaintiffs are awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in
 v 
responding to the defendant's motion, with such amount to be established by affidavit of 
plaintiffs' counsel 
Dated this . % 
u 
day of. 7< \M£^ 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of June, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: William E. Frazier, LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN % BANGERTER, 720 S. River 
Rd, Suite A-200, St. George, UT 84790. 
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STEVEN R. BANGERTER (Utah Bar No. 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
riVTHOISTWCT COURT 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife 
(RESPONDENTS), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV 
(APPELLANT), 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 11(G) 
Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, 
LLC, through counsel, Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, provides the following Statement 
of Evidence, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(g). 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
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In addition to the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs, the Motion to Set Aside Default filed by 
Defendants, and opposition papers related thereto, there were competing Proposed Orders 
filed after the conclusion of oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default. 
Based upon conversations with court personnel, it was discovered that Defendant's Proposed 
Order was discarded by the court when it opted to sign Plaintiffs' Proposed Order. As such, a 
true and correct copy of Defendant's Proposed Order is attached hereto as "Exhibit A." 
The oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default under Utah Rule of .
 ; 
Civil Procedure 60 et seq came for hearing on May 15, 2008. There exists no transcript of the 
oral argument, as a court reporter was not present. During the hearing, counsel for Defendant 
asserted that the Default Judgment was procured by Plaintiff via mistake, surprise, 
inadvertence, or excusable neglect; namely, due to the rescission of Plaintiffs' counsel's 
agreement to provide Defendant's prior counsel with an open extension to answer the 
complaint without timely notifying Defendant's prior counsel of his intention. Plaintiffs' 
counsel did not fax, call, or email Defendant's former counsel, but rather, mailed documents 
seeking entry of default with knowledge that the mailing was destined for an out-of-state 
address with an intervening weekend. 
Further, it was argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over Defendant. As briefed, 
Defendant has no meaningful or significant contacts with the state of Utah, and does not 
purposefully avail itself to the benefits of the laws of the state of Utah. Defendant does not 
advertise or otherwise maintain a presence in the state of Utah. 
2 
DEFEND ANT/ APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
APPET J,ATE PROCEDURE 11(G) 
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Finally, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' Default Judgment against Defendant should 
be set aside under traditional principles of equity and estoppel. Plaintiffs should have been 
estopped from the entry of a default judgment due to the agreement between Plaintiffs' 
counsel and former counsel for the defense that an open-extension was granted. Such 
agreement was not rescinded in a manner that gave Defendant reasonable time to file a
 ; •.,.-.• 
responsive pleading to the complaint. Additionally, the state of Utah has a long-standing 
preference to have matters adjudicated on the merits, as opposed to via default; especially in 
light of the fact that the trial court had no personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and Defendant 
raised this issue in its first court submission. 
The court took the matter under submission and requested proposed orders from both 
parties. Defendant's proposed order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." Plaintiffs proposed 
order, which was eventually signed by the court, is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, PC 
By: WILLIAM E. FRAZIER, ESQ. 
3 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
DATED: July "25 .2008 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 11(G) 
was mailed, postage prepaid on July _2S 2008 to the following: 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, UT 84791 
Abbie^Thorrfe 
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STEVEN R. BANGERTER (Utah Bar No. 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS YEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v o . > 
WHEELER RV LAS YEGAS, LLC, a ) 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, ) 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, } 
Defendant. < 
) [PROPOSED] ORDER 
' Civil No.: 070501867 
) Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendant, WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, came 
for hearing on May 15,2008 before the Honorable Eric A. Ludlow. After consideration of the 
pleadings, court file, and oral arguments thereon, the Court rules as follows: 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default is GRANTED. 
Defendant demonstrated, through the Affidavit of Sharon Nelson, that this Default was 
taken as a result of surprise, mistake, and inadvertence. Based upon the grant of an open 
extension given by Plaintiffs' counsel, and the ongoing communication between Defendant 
Wlieelers by and through their representative Sharon Nelson and Plaintiffs' counsel, there was no 
rescission of the open extension to answer the complaint. The first notice that Defendant had of 
such rescission, by Plaintiffs' mailed Application for Entry of Default, was not received until 
December 5, 2007 due to an intervening weekend and out-of-state mailing. Plaintiffs' counsel 
could have faxed or telephoned Defendants to rescind his open extension to answer, but failed to 
do so. As such, by the time that Defendants learned of the rescission of the open extension to 
answer, a Default Judgment had already been taken. 
Likewise, Defendant's Motion was made in accordance with Rule 60(B) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the Motion was filed less than three months after the Default 
Judgment was entered. Further, Defendant has provided facts demonstrating that legal and valid 
defenses exist; namely, lack of personal jurisdiction and misjoinder of parties. 
"The rule that courts will incline towards granting relief to a party who has not had the 
opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court level. State of Utah v. D. 
John Musselman and Linda Ann Coram (1983) 667 P.2d 1055 and Hnl; 1983 Utah LEXIS 1086. 
"Where any reasonable excuse is offered by defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless it appears that to do so would result in substantial 
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injustice to the adverse party." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor 
(1975), 544 P.2d 876. 
Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that substantial injustice would result in Setting 
Aside the Default Judgment. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence regarding substantial 
prejudice would result in the event that this Motion were granted. Plaintiffs may amend their 
complaint to add parties should they so desire. 
Defendant must file an Answer or other responsive pleading on or before 
DATED this day of ,2008. 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
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GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
Gar)' G. Kuhlmann (#4994) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
107 South 1470 East, Suite 105 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, Utah 84791-0387 
Telephone: (435)656-6156 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-on 'MJ i CQl 
2000JUH I3,-15H I,: 
•/. 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFFS >rB&££Q3£fi FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
Civil No. 070501867 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
The plaintiffs hereby submit their proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order regarding the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and respectfully request 
that the Court adopt such findings, conclusions and order. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on May 15, 2008, on defendant's Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment. The Court reviewed the motion, the opposition thereto, the 
affidavits supporting the motion and opposition, and the file herein. The Court also heard and 
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considered the arguments of counsel at the hearing on May 15, 2008. Based thereon, the Court 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A Complaint in the above-captioned matter was filed on August 16, 2007, and 
was served upon the defendant on August 30, 2007. 
2.:.,...•.; The Complaint was served upon the defendant on August 20, 2007. 
3. During September, 2007, plaintiffs5 counsel was contacted by Sharon Nelson, 
attorney for the defendant. Ms. Nelson requested an extension of time to answer the Complaint. 
4. During such conversation, Ms. Nelson informed plaintiffs' counsel that the 
dealership at issue had changed ownership and that the defendant was not responsible for the 
plaintiffs5 claims in this case. 
5. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to grant Ms. Nelson an extension to allow her a short 
time to provide plaintiffs' counsel with evidence that the defendant was not the proper party in 
this case. 
6. After not hearing from or receiving information from Ms. Nelson for some time, 
plaintiffs' counsel's office contacted Ms. Nelson's office by phone on October 15, 2007, and 
demanded that the requested information be provided or an Answer filed. 
7. On October 30, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a fax from Ms. Nelson 
containing only a Bill of Sale which was apparently part of a larger contract. 
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8. On that same date, plaintiffs' counsel's office responded to Ms. Nelson's fax and 
informed her that to evaluate the matter, plaintiffs counsel would need to receive the entire 
agreement and other documents related to the alleged sale of the dealership. 
9. On November 1, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a second fax from Ms. Nelson 
requiring that plaintiffs' counsel sign a confidentiality agreement before any further documents 
would be provided. 
10. Plaintiffs' counsel refused to sign the confidentiality agreement since it was the 
defendant that was requesting that the defendant be dismissed from the case and because to do so 
could prejudice the plaintiff in using the information in the purchase documents in this case. 
11. After receiving no further information and having no further contact with Ms. 
Nelson, on November 27, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel advised Ms. Nelson that plaintiffs would be 
seeking the entry of default and default judgment. 
12. An Application for Entry of Default, and Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
were filed with the court on November 27, 2007. 
13. A Default Certificate was entered on December 3, 2007, and Default Judgment 
was entered on December 4, 2007. 
14. Despite having been advised that the plaintiffs would be seeking a default 
judgment and being provided with a copy of the Application for Entry of Default, the defendant's 
attorney took no action to prevent the entry of default. 
15. On December 19, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel received a phone call from William 
Frazier, the new attorney for the defendant. Mr. Frazier asked plaintiffs' counsel if he would be 
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willing to stipulate to sel aside the Default Judgment based upon his assertion that his client had 
purchased the business after the plaintiffs purchase of the motorhome at issue. 
16. While plaintiffs' counsel refused to simply stipulate to set aside the Default 
Judgment without some additional evidence, plaintiffs' counsel informed Mr. Frazier of 
plaintiffs' counsel's continuing willingness to review any documents he would like to provide. 
17. At the end of the conversation, Mr. Frazier informed plaintiffs' counsel that he 
would be obtaining, and would provide plaintiffs' counsel with, documentation to show that Mr, 
Frazier's client was not the proper defendant in this matter. 
.18. Despite being told again that plaintiffs' counsel would be provided certain 
documents by the defendant, plaintiffs' counsel received no further documents and had no further 
contact from the defendant's attorney until February 27, 2008. 
19. On February 27, 2008, plaintiffs' counsel received a voice-mail message from 
defendant's counsel simply indicating that defendant would be filing a motion seeking to set 
aside the Default Judgment in this case. 
20. The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed with the Court 
on February 29, 2008, four days shy of three months from the date of entry of the Default 
Judgment. 
21. The defendant was afforded over three months to provide the plaintiffs with the 
documents requested by plaintiffs or to file an Answer in this case. 
22. The only statements provided to the Court to demonstrate a meritorious defense to 
this action by the defendant are the conclusory statements of defendant's counsel that: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a. "The evidence will show that Plaintiffs have sued the wrong party.'5 See 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment at p. 3. 
b. Defendants (sic) did not own the subject dealership when the Plaintiffs 
purchased the recreational vehicle." Id. at p. 4. 
c. Defendant will be able to demonstrate that it is not that proper party, and 
that any assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is highly questionable. . . "Id. 
From the foregoing, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To be relieved from the Default Judgment, defendant must show: (a) that the 
motion for relief from the judgment was filed within three months of the entry of the judgment; 
(b) that mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect were present; and (c) that the 
defendant has a meritorious defense to the action. See URCP 60(b). 
2. "Excusableneglect" is "the existence of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent 
person under similar circumstances." Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, If 27. 
3. To show excusable neglect "the movant must show that he has used due diligence 
and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. . . . 
[A] party must provide the court with specific details that demonstrate due diligence in spite of 
uncontrollable circumstances" Id. 
4. "A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed 
facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered. 
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Defendant must therefore do more than merely dispute or deny the truth of plaintiff s allegations; 
he must set forth specific facts showing meritorious defenses to those allegations in order to have 
the default judgment set aside." State vs. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1057 - 1058 (Utah 1983). 
5. Defendant has asserted no basis for finding the existence of mistake or 
inadvertence in this case but rather relies on the claims of excusable neglect and surprise. 
6. Defendant did not exercise due diligence in this matter since an answer could 
have been filed by the defendant at anytime during the more than three months between that date 
the Complaint was served and the date the default was entered. Nothing prevented the defendant 
from filing such Answer and there were no circumstances outside the control of the defendant 
which rendered the defendant unable to file an Answer. An Answer was not filed simply because 
the defendant chose not to do so. Based thereon, the defendant has failed to show the existence 
of excusable neglect in this case. 
7. The defendant has further failed to establish the existence of surprise. 
Defendant's counsel was told that only a short time would be given to provide the documents 
requested by plaintiffs5 counsel and defendant failed to provide such documents. Further, the 
defendant was informed that the plaintiff was seeking a default and a copy of the Application for 
Entry of Default was provided to defendant's counsel. Nevertheless, no action was taken by 
defendant to prevent or overcome a default being entered until almost three months after the 
default judgment was entered. 
8. The defendant has failed to provide the Court with any "specific and sufficiently 
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
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entered.55 Thus, even if the Court were to find the existence of a mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect or surprise, the defendant's motion is deficient and should be denied. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters 
the following: 
ORDER 
1. The defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is denied. 
2. The plaintiffs are awarded their costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
responding to the defendant's motion, with such amount to be established by affidavit of 
plaintiffs' counsel. 
Dated this . o > u day of _ T. \M£/ 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of June, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: William E. Frazier, LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN % BANGERTER, 720 S. River 
Rd., Suite A-200, St. George, UT 84790. 
Gar)7 G JCuhlmann 
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GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
Gary G. Kuhlmann (#4994) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
107 South 1470 East, Suite 105 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, Utah 84791-0387 
Telephone: (435) 656-6156 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
v. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendants. 
) Case No. 070501867 
) 
) Judge Eric A Ludlow 
) 
The plaintiffs hereby certify that a signed copy of Plaintiffs' Findings, Conclusions and 
Order was mailed first class, postage prepaid, this lsl day of July, 2008, to: William E. Frazier, 
Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, 720 S. River Road, Suite A-200, St. George, UT 84790. 
Gary ^Kuhlmann 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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- FILED 
MfTH DISTRICT COURT 
2008 JUL 25 AH 10: 50 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STEVEN R. BANGERTER (Utah Bar No. 10051) BY. 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, U T 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife 
(RESPONDENTS), 
Plaintiffs, \ 
vs. < 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a ) 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, ) 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV ] 
(APPELLANT), 
Defendant. < 
) DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
) CERTIFICATE OF NON-REQUEST OF 
) TRANSCRIPTS OR PROCEEDINGS 
) PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
) APPELLATE PROCEDURE 11(E)(1) 
| Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, 
LLC, through counsel, Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, does not request any transcripts 
of proceedings, as it is believed that no such transcripts exist. 
DATED: July Z5, 2008 Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, PC 
4/-£T£ 
By: WILLIAM E. FRAZIER, ESQ. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
CERTIFICATE OF NON-REQUEST OF TRANSCRIPTS OR PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT 
TO UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE PR OCEDURE 11(E)(1) 
was mailed, postage prepaid on July 23,2008 to the following: 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 910387 
St. George, UT 84791 
Abbie Thorpe 
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STEVEN R. BANGEIITER (Utah Bar No. 1005]) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZIER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS YEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSON and DONNA 
JUDSON, husband and wife 
/ T l P n t l A l i TT>vT~,'K. T r P n \ (RESPONDENTS), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. < 
WHEELER RV LAS YEGAS, LLC, a ) 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, 
dba WHEELER'S LAS VEGAS RV ) 
(APPELLANT), 
Defendant. <, 
) REQUEST FOR STAY OF DEFAULT 
) JUDGMENT AND DETERMINATION 
) OF AMOUNT PAYABLE TO COURT 
) FOR SECURITY PURPOSES IN LIEU 
) OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND PURSUANT 
) TO URCP 62, OR IN THE 
) ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND, AND REQUEST 
FOR HEARING 
Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, 
LLC, through counsel, Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, will move the Court, pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62 (i)(2) to permit the deposit of money in court in lieu of 
giving a Supersedeas Bond, or in the alternative, the filing of a Supersedeas Bond to stay 
attempts at executing upon the Default Judgment obtained by Plaintiffs in this matter. 
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Defendant/Appellant continues to assert that this Court has no jurisdiction over it, and 
therefore, nothing in this filing should be construed as assent to the exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction over Defendant. 
I . • ' ' 
THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO PERMIT THE DEPOSIT OF A SUM OF 
MONEY WITH THE COURT IN LIEU OF A SUPERSEDEAS BOND PURSUANT 
TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 62(i)(2) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62(i)(2) sets forth "Upon motion and good cause shown, 
the court may permit a deposit of money in court or other security to be given in lieu of 
giving a Supersedeas Bond under Subdivision (d).V/ URCP 62(i)(2). An appellant may, "by 
giving a Supersedeas Bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by 
law or these rules. Thebond may be given at or after the time of filing the Notice to Appeal. 
The stay is effective when the Supersedeas Bond is approved by the court." URCP 62(d). 
Here, Defendant/Appellant Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal, and all other documents as set forth by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Plaintiffs have attempted to execute on the Default Judgment during the pendency of the 
Appeal, thus necessitating this Motion. 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC is owned by Freedom Roads, LLC. WHEELER 
RV LAS VEGAS, LLC. aquired the assets of L.V.R.V., Inc., a Nevada corporation years after 
Plaintiffs acquired the recreational vehicle that is the subject of this litigation from L.V.R.V., 
2 
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Inc. Because the relevant financial inquiry for this Motion pertains to the present 
Defendant/Appellant, all assertions relate to Defendant/Appellant. 
Rule 62 (j)(l) states, ".. .a court shall set the Supersedeas Bond in an amount that 
adequately protects the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by the Appeal 
and assures payment in the event the judgment is affirmed. In setting the amount, the court 
may consider any relevant factor, including: (a) the judgment debtor's ability to pay the 
judgment; (d) the judgment debtor's likelihood of success on appeal. URCP 62(j)(l), et seq. 
The presumptive amount of Supersedeas Bonds is set as the amount of compensatory 
damages plus costs and attorney fees plus three years of interest at the applicable rate. URCP 
Rule 62(j)(2)(a). As referenced earlier, the Court may, upon good cause shown, allow a 
deposit in lieu of a Supersedeas Bond. URCP 62(i)(2). 
It is in the interests of both parties to preserve as much capital as possible to pay toward 
any judgment that maybe affirmed by the Utah Appellate Courts. Here, if Defendant were 
required to post a bond, funds would be necessary to pay an appropriate surety. Further, 
Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC, as demonstrated in the Affidavit of Brent Moody filed 
herewith, is a fiscally solvent limited liability company capable of paying any judgment that 
may be eventually affirmed by an appeals court, with most recent financial reports revealing 
assets exceeding liabilities by over $2,000,000 in the most recent financial report. Because 
Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC is adequately solvent to pay any eventual judgment, and has so 
demonstrated, it would be of little value for the Court to require a six-figure deposit of funds 
that would remain stagnant. 
3 
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II. 
PRAYER 
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests an amount equal to ten (10) percent of all 
amounts set forth in compensatory damages and attorney fees obtained by Plaintiff to date, 
which total $ 151,931.61. As such, Defendant/Appellant requests to file with the court the sum 
of $15,193.16 for security, in lieu of a Supersedeas Bond. 
In the alternative, appellant requests that an amount for a Supersedeas Bond be set in an 
amount below the presumptive amount in the interests of preserving capital for potential 
settlement negotiations during the pendency of the Appeal. 
If the court is unable to grant an}7 request contained herein, appellant requests that an 
amount be set for a Supersedeas Bond. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
DATED: October 2 , 2008 Law Offices of Steven R. Bangerter, PC 
vte 
By: WILLIAM E. FRAZIER, ESQ. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, 
postage prepaid on October _2=_, 2008 to the following: 
Gary G. Kuhlmann 
GARY G. KUHLMANN & ASSOCIATES, PC 
113 East 200 North, Suite 1 
P.O.Box910387 '•-•.•• - -: .; .-^:-• 
St. George, UT 84791 
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STEVEN R. BANGER.TER (Utah Bar No. 10051) 
WILLIAM E. FRAZ1ER (Utah Bar No. 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN RBANGERTER 
720 South River Road, Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM JUDSOtt and DONNA ) [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
JUDSON, husband and wife, DEFEND ANT'S REQUEST FOR STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF DEFAULT 
Plaintiffs, ) JUDGMENT, DETERMINATION OF 
AMOUNT PAYABLE FOR SECURITY 
vs. ) PURPOSES IN LIEU OF SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND PURSUANT TO URCP 62, OR IN 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC, a ) THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR 
Nevada foreign limited liability company, ) SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
dba WHEELER'S LA.S VEGAS RV, 
Defendant. 
Civil No.: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Defendant, WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC's Request for Stay of Execution of 
Default Judgment, Determination of Amount Payable for Security Purposes in Lieu of 
Supersedeas Bond Pursuant to URCP 62, or in the alternative, Request for Supersedeas Bond 
came for review and/or hearing. After consideration of the pleadings, court file, and oral 
arguments thereon, and good cause having been shown therefor, the Court rules as follows: 
111 
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Defendant's Request to Stay Execution of execution of is GRANTED. Defendant, shall 
within thirty (30) days of this Order deposit/lodge the following with the Court (check one): 
$15,193,16 Payment for Security 
Supersedeas Bond in the amount of $ 
DATED this day of
 : _ , 2008. 
Honorable Eric A. Ludlow 
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BY. 
Steven R. Bangerter (State Bar No. 10051) 
William E. Frazier (State Bar No, 11447) 
LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R BANGERTER 
720 S, RiverU> Suite A-200 
St. George, UT 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-7004 
Facsimile: (435) 673-1964 
Attorney for Defendant, 
WHEELER RV LAS VEGAS, LLC 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Washington County Hall of Justice, 200 North 200 East, St. George, Utah 84770 
UlmCOuHn 
WILLIAMJUDSON and DONNA JUDSON, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WHEELER RVLAS VEGAS, LLC, a Nevada 
foreign limited liability company, dba 
WHEELER'S IAS VEGAS RV, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT MOODY IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S REQUEST 
FOR STAY OF EXECUTION ON 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND 
DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT 
PAYABLE TO COURT FOR SECURITY 
PURPOSES IN LIEU OF SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND PURSUANT TO URCP 62, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR 
SUPERSED1ASBOND 
Civil No,: 070501867 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
I, BRENT MOODY, DECLARE AS FOLLOWS: 
1, I am tie Executive Vice President of Business Development and General Counsel for 
'Freedom Roads, LLC, the parent company of Wheeler RV Las Vegas, LLC. 
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2, J havepersonal knowledge of the contents of this affidavit, and if called as a witness, 
couldtestify competently thereto. 
3, Wheelers RV Las Vegas, LLC acquired the assets of L.V.RV,, Inc., on or around 
November 29, 2004, 
4, I havepersonal knowledge of the financial condition of Wheeler RV Las Vegas, also 
known as Las Vegas RV, based upon my position within the company and the parameters 
of my oversight of the dealership, 
5, For the calendar year ending December 31, 2G07, the last year for which there is a 
complete annual .accounting, Las Vegas RV had total assets of $ 16,316,65.0, with total 
liabilities of $13,984,514,. 
6, Attacted hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the most recent annual 
accounting, depicting the figures set forth .above, 
7, I am intimately familiar with the finances of Las Vegas .RV, and attest that there are 
presently no defaults in financial obligations or plans for filing for any type of relief in 
bankruptcy. 
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19 11 8, In the event .thatDefendant/Appellant is unsuccessful at all levels of available, appeals, 
2 0 J J Las Vegas RV> based on.its current financial condition and my personal laiowledge 
thereof, would be able to satisfy the judgment thatis the subject of the pending appeal. 
n Dated: [0'\ri\O^ Signed: ^ j ^ / j / / i»J 
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State of ^1(^/1.5 
County of L ^ b 
Brent Moody, appeared before me this * W day of Ocwb^ 2008, and proved 
to jne his identity in the form of a QtiUW L\'c«^j , After being sworn and while under oath, 
Brent Moody stated that he had read this document understood the contents, and that the contents 
were true of his own personal Icnowledge. Brent Moody then signed this document in my presence, 
OFFICIAL-SEAL 
JENNIFERS. NAPIER 
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF ILLINOIS 
MY COMMISSION.EXPIRES OCT. 31, 2011 hllkM famk 
public f '' NotarwRublic 
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